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Abstract
We analyze the welfare consequences of a monopolist having additional information about con-
sumerstastes, beyond the prior distribution; the additional information can be used to charge
di¤erent prices to di¤erent segments of the market, i.e., carry out "third degree price discrimina-
tion".
We show that the segmentation and pricing induced by the additional information can achieve
every combination of consumer and producer surplus such that: (i) consumer surplus is non-
negative, (ii) producer surplus is at least as high as prots under the uniform monopoly price,
and (iii) total surplus does not exceed the e¢ cient gains from trade.
As well as characterizing the welfare impact of price discrimination, we examine the limits of
how prices and quantities can change under price discrimination. We also examine the limits
of price discrimination in richer environments with quantity discrimination and limited ability to
segment the market.
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A classic and central issue in the economic analysis of monopoly is the impact of discriminatory pricing
on consumer and producer surplus. A monopolist engages in third degree price discrimination if he uses
additional information about consumer characteristics to o¤er di¤erent prices to di¤erent segments
of the aggregate market. A large and classical literature (reviewed below) examines the impact of
particular segmentations on consumer and producer surplus, as well as on output and prices.
In this paper, we characterize what could happen to consumer and producer surplus for all possible
segmentations of the market. We know that at least two points will be attained. If the monopolist
has no information beyond the prior distribution of valuations, there will be no segmentation. The
producer charges the uniform monopoly price and gets the associated monopoly prot, which is a lower
bound on producer surplus; consumers receive a positive surplus, the standard information rent. This
is marked by point A in Figure 1. On the other hand, if the monopolist has complete information about
the valuation of the buyers, then he can completely segment the market according to true valuations.
This results in perfect or rst degree price discrimination. The resulting allocation is e¢ cient, but
consumer surplus is zero and the producer captures all of the gains from e¢ cient trade. This is marked
by point B in Figure 1.
Figure 1: The Surplus Triangle of Price Discrimination
To begin with, we can identify some elementary bounds on consumer and producer surplus in
any market segmentation. First, consumer surplus must be non-negative as a consequence of the
participation constraint; a consumer will not buy the good at a price above his valuation. Second, the
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producer must get at least the surplus that he could get if there was no segmentation and he charged
the uniform monopoly price. Third, the sum of consumer and producer surplus cannot exceed the total
value that consumers receive from the good, when that value exceeds the marginal cost of production.
The shaded right angled triangle in Figure 1 illustrates these three bounds.
Our main result is that every welfare outcome satisfying these constraints is attainable by some
market segmentation. This is the entire shaded triangle in Figure 1. The point marked C is where
consumer surplus is maximized; in particular, the producer is held down to his uniform monopoly
prots, and consumers get the residual of the social surplus from an e¢ cient allocation. At the point
marked D, social surplus is minimized by holding producer surplus down to uniform monopoly prots
and holding consumer surplus down to zero.
We can explain these results most easily in the case where there is a nite set of possible consumer
valuations and the cost of production is zero. The latter is a normalization we will maintain throughout
most of the paper. We will rst explain one intuitive way to maximize consumer surplus, i.e., realize
point C. The set of market prices will consist of every valuation less than or equal to the uniform
monopoly price. Suppose that we can divide the market into segments corresponding to each of these
prices in such a way that (i) in each segment, the consumersvaluations are always greater than or
equal to the price for that segment; and (ii) in each segment, the producer is indi¤erent between
charging the price for that segment and charging the uniform monopoly price. Then the producer is
indi¤erent to charging the uniform monopoly price on all segments, so producer surplus must equal
uniform monopoly prot. The allocation is also e¢ cient, so consumers must obtain the rest of the
e¢ cient surplus. Thus, (i) and (ii) are su¢ cient conditions for a segmentation to maximize consumer
surplus.
We now describe a way of constructing such a market segmentation iteratively. Start with a "lowest
price segment" where a price equal to the lowest valuation will be charged. All consumers with the
lowest valuation go into this segment. For each higher valuation, a share of consumers with that
valuation also enters into the lowest price segment. While the relative share of each higher valuation
(with respect to each other) is the same as in the prior distribution, the proportion of all of the
higher valuations is lower than in the prior distribution. We can choose that proportion between zero
and one such that the producer is indi¤erent between charging the segment price and the uniform
monopoly price. We know this must be possible because if the proportion were equal to one, the
uniform monopoly price would be prot maximizing for the producer (by denition); if the proportion
were equal to zero so only lowest valuation consumers were in the market the lowest price would be
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prot maximizing; and, by keeping the relative proportions above the lowest valuation constant, there
is no price other than these two that could be optimal. Now we have created one market segment
satisfying properties (i) and (ii) above. But notice that the consumers not put in the lowest price
segment are in the same relative proportions as they were in the original population. In particular, the
original uniform monopoly price will be optimal on this "residual segment." We can apply the same
procedure to construct a segment in which the market price is the second lowest valuation: put all the
remaining consumers with the second lowest valuation into this market; for higher valuations, put a
xed proportion of remaining consumers into that segment; choose the proportion so that the producer
is indi¤erent between charging the second highest valuation and the uniform monopoly price. This
construction iterates until it reaches the uniform monopoly price at which point we have recovered
the entire population and we have attained point C. An analogous construction reported in the
paper shows how to attain point D.
We also have a deeper geometric proof of our main result. This argument establishes an even
stronger result: Any point where the monopolist is held down to his uniform monopoly prots
including outcomes A, C, and D in Figure 1 can all be achieved with the same segmentation! In
this segmentation, consumer surplus varies because the monopolist is indi¤erent between charging
di¤erent prices. This argument gives a deeper insight into why our results are true. Consider the set
of all markets where a given monopoly price is optimal. This set is convex, so any aggregate market
with the given monopoly price can be decomposed as a weighted sum of markets which are extreme
points of this set, which in turn denes a segmentation. These extremal markets must take a special
form. In any extremal market, the monopolist will be indi¤erent to setting any price in the support
of consumers valuations. Thus, each subset of valuations that includes the given monopoly price
generates an extreme point. If the monopolist charges the uniform monopoly price on each extreme
segment, we get point A. If he charges the lowest value in the support, we get point C, and if he
charges the highest value we get point D.
Thus, we are able to demonstrate that points B, C, and D can be attained. Every point in
their convex hull, i.e., the shaded triangle in Figure 1, can also be attained simply by averaging the
segmentations that work for each extreme point, and we have a complete characterization of all possible
welfare outcomes.
While we focus on welfare implications, we can also completely characterize possible output levels
and derive implications for prices. An upper bound on output is the e¢ cient quantity, and this is
realized by any segmentation along the e¢ cient frontier. In particular, it is attained in any consumer
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surplus maximizing segmentation. In such segmentations, prices are always (weakly) below the uniform
monopoly price. We also attain a lower bound on output. Note that the monopolist must receive
at least his uniform monopoly prots, so this prot is a lower bound on social surplus. We say a
segmentation is conditionally e¢ cient if, conditional on the amount of output sold, the allocation of
the good is socially e¢ cient. Such segmentations minimize output for a given level of social surplus. In
fact, we construct a social surplus minimizing segmentation that is conditionally e¢ cient and therefore
attains a lower bound on output. In this segmentation, prices are always (weakly) higher than the
uniform monopoly price.
Using our result for discrete distributions, we are able to prove similar results for any market
that has a well-behaved distribution of consumersvaluations. A convergence result establishes the
existence of segmentations that attain points C and D for any Borel measurable distribution. When the
distribution over values has a density, we can construct market segmentations analogous to those for
discrete values. These segmentations involve a continuum of segments which are indexed by a suggested
market price for each segment. Conditional on a given price, there is a mass point of consumers with
valuation equal to the market price, with valuations above (for consumer surplus maximization) and
below (for social surplus minimization) distributed according to densities. The densities are closed
form solutions to di¤erential equations.
We contribute to a large literature on third degree price discrimination, starting with Pigou (1920).
This literature examines what happens to prices, quantity, consumer surplus, producer surplus and
social welfare as the market is segmented. Pigou (1920) considered the case of two segments with linear
demand, where both segments are served when there is a uniform price. In this special case, he showed
that output does not change under price discrimination. Since di¤erent prices are charged in the two
segments, this means that some high valuation consumers are replaced by low valuation consumers,
and thus social welfare decreases. We can visualize the results of Pigou (1920) and other authors in
Figure 1. Pigou (1920) showed that this particular segmentation resulted in a west-northwest move
(i.e., move from point A to a point below the negative 450 line going through A). A literature since then
has focused on identifying su¢ cient conditions on the shape of demand for social welfare to increase or
decrease with price discrimination. A recent paper of Aguirre, Cowan, and Vickers (2010) unies and
extends this literature1 and, in particular, identies su¢ cient conditions for price discrimination to
either increase or decrease social welfare (i.e., move above or below the negative 45 line through A).
Restricting attention to market segments that have concave prot functions and an additional property
1Key intervening work includes Robinson (1933), Schmalensee (1981) and Varian (1985).
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("increasing ratio condition") that they argue is commonly met, they show that welfare decreases if
the direct demand in the higher priced market is at least as convex as that in the lower priced market;
welfare is higher if prices are not too far apart and the inverse demand function in the lower priced
market is locally more convex than that in the higher priced market. They note how their result ties in
with an intuition of Robinson (1933): concave demand means that price changes have a small impact
on quantity, while convex demand means that prices have a large impact on quantity. If the price rises
in a market with concave demand and falls in a market with convex demand, the increase in output
in the low-price market will outweigh the decrease in the high price market, and welfare will go up.
Our paper also gives su¢ cient conditions for di¤erent welfare impacts of segmentation. However,
unlike most of the literature, we allow for segments with non-concave prot functions. Indeed, the
segmentations giving rise to extreme points in welfare space (i.e., consumer surplus maximization
at point C and social surplus minimization at point D) rely on non-concave prot functions. This
ensures that the type of local conditions highlighted in the existing literature will not be relevant. Our
non-local results suggest some very di¤erent intuitions. Of course, consumer surplus always increases
if prices drop in all markets. We show that for any demand curves, low valuation consumers can
be pooled with the right number of high valuation consumers to give the producer an incentive to
o¤er prices below the monopoly price. Moreover, this incentive can be made arbitrarily weak, so that
consumers capture the e¢ ciency gain.
The literature also has results on the impact of segmentation on output and prices. On output,
the focus is on identifying when an increase in output is necessary for an increase in welfare. Although
we do not analyze the question in detail in this paper, a given output level is associated with many
di¤erent levels of producer, consumer and social surplus. We do identify the highest and lowest
possible output over all market segmentations. On prices, Nahata, Ostaszewski, and Sahoo (1990)
o¤er examples with non-concave prot functions where third degree price discrimination may lead
prices in all market segments to move in the same direction; it may be that all prices increase or all
prices decrease. We show that one can create such segmentations for any demand curve. In other
words, in constructing our critical market segmentations, we show that it is always possible to have all
prices fall or all prices rise (with non-concave prot functions in the segments remaining a necessary
condition, as shown by Nahata, Ostaszewski, and Sahoo (1990)).
If market segmentation is exogenous, one might argue that the segmentations that deliver extremal
surpluses are special and might be seen as atypical. But to the extent that market segmentation is
endogenous, our results can be used to o¤er predictions about what segmentations might arise. For
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example, consider an internet company with a large amount of data about the valuations of a large
numbers of consumers. If the internet company sold this information to producers who would use it
to price discriminate, they have an incentive to sell as much information as possible. But suppose
that the internet company instead chose to release the information for free to producers in order to
maximize consumer welfare (perhaps because of regulatory pressure or a longer term business model).
Our results describe how such a consumer minded internet company would endogenously choose to
segment the market. In particular, they would have an incentive to segment the market in such a way
that prots were not concave.2
We also consider the extension of our results to two important environments. First, we ask what
would happen if each consumer demands more than one unit of the good, so there is scope for second
degree price discrimination in concert with market segmentation. Consumers vary in their marginal
utility for quantity, and in each segment, the producer can screen using quantity-price bundles, as in
Maskin and Riley (1984). We derive a closed form characterization of the set of attainable consumer
and producer surplus pairs. Now, the earlier extreme results that e¢ cient and zero consumer surplus
segmentations holding producer surplus to the prior information prot exist no longer hold. But there
continues to be a very large set of feasible welfare outcomes, and thus scope for market segmentation
to be Pareto-improving or Pareto-worsening.
Second, we consider the case where there are exogenous limits on the kind of market segments
that can be induced. This would be the case if the monopolist is limited to access information about
particular consumer characteristics, and those characteristics are associated with characteristic-specic
demand curves. The monopolists information would induce segments that are convex combinations
of the underlying demand curves. This gives rise to problems that are intermediate between our main
results, where any segmentation is possible, and the classical price discrimination literature (reviewed
above and summarized and extended by Aguirre, Cowan, and Vickers (2010)), where there is an
exogenous division of the market. The literature compares outcomes under full discrimination and no
discrimination, whereas we consider the range of outcomes possible under partial segmentation, where
the monopolist imperfectly observes which division of the market he is facing. We give examples
with intermediate results, in which the set of possible welfare outcomes is larger than in the classical
2A subtlety of this story, however, is that this could only be done by randomly allocating consumers with the same
valuation to di¤erent segments with di¤erent prices. Thus consumers who knew their valuations would still have an
incentive to misreport them to a benevolent intermediary, and thus they would still have an incentive (although perhaps
a more subtle one) to conceal their valuations in anticipation of their later use in price discrimination, as in recent work
of Taylor (2004) and Acquisti and Varian (2005).
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literature but less permissive than our benchmark unrestricted model.
Our work has a methodological connection to two strands of literature. Kamenica and Gentzkow
(2011)s study of "Bayesian persuasion" considers how a sender would choose to transmit information
to a receiver, if he could commit to an information revelation strategy before observing his private
information. They provide a characterization of such optimal communication strategies as well as
applications. If we let the receiver be the producer choosing prices, and let the sender be a planner
maximizing some weighted sum of consumer and producer surplus, our problem belongs to the class
of problems analyzed by Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011). They show that if one plots the utility of
the "sender" as a function of the distribution of the senders types, his highest attainable utility can
be read o¤ from the "concavication" of that function.3 The concavication arguments are especially
powerful in the case of two types. While we do not use concavication arguments in our main result
at all, we use them directly in our two type analysis of second degree price discrimination and partial
segmentation.
Bergemann and Morris (2013a) examine the general question, in strategic many-player settings, of
what behavior could arise in an incomplete information game if players observe additional information
not known to the analyst. They show that behavior that might arise is equivalent to an incomplete
information version of correlated equilibrium termed "Bayes correlated equilibrium". Bergemann and
Morris (2013a) explore the one-player version of Bayes correlated equilibrium, and its connection to the
work of Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) and others. In Bergemann and Morris (2013b), these insights
were developed in detail in the context of linear-quadratic payo¤s and normal distributed uncertainty.
Using the language of Bergemann and Morris (2013a), the present paper considers the game of a
producer making take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers to consumers. Here, consumers have a dominant strategy
to accept all o¤ers strictly less than their valuation and reject all o¤ers strictly greater than their
valuation, and we select for equilibria in which consumers accept o¤ers that make them indi¤erent.
We characterize what could happen for any information structure that players might observe, as long as
consumers know their own valuations. Thus, we identify possible payo¤s of the producer and consumers
in all Bayes correlated equilibria of the price setting game. Thus, our results are a striking application
of the methodologies of Bergemann and Morris (2013a), (2013b) and Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011)
to the general problem of price discrimination.
3Aumann and Maschler (1995), show that the concavication of the (stage) payo¤ function represents the limit
payo¤ that an informed player can achieve in a repeated zero sum game with incomplete information. In particular,
their Lemma 5.3, the "splitting lemma", derives a partial disclosure strategy on the basis of a concavied payo¤ function.
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We present our main result in the case of discrete values in Section 2. We rst give a charac-
terization of the welfare set using the extremal segmentations described above. In addition to this
abstract argument, we also provide a constructive approach that demonstrates the range of segmenta-
tions that can arise. The constructive arguments also allow us to characterize other consequences of
discrimination, e.g., bounds on output. In Section 3, we extend our results to general settings with a
continuum of values, so that there is a continuous demand curve. The discrete and continuum analyses
are complementary: while they lead to the same substantive conclusions and economic insights, the
arguments and mathematical formulations look very di¤erent, so we nd it useful to report both cases
independently. In Section 4, we analyze a version of the quantity discriminating monopolist with two
types, and we then analyze price discrimination when there are exogenous limitations on how the
market can be segmented. In Section 5, we conclude.
2 The Limits of Discrimination: The Discrete Case
A monopolist sells to a continuum of consumers, each of whom demands one unit of the good being
sold. We normalize the constant marginal cost of the good to zero. In the current section, we assume
that there are K possible values vk 2 V  R+ that the consumers might have with:
0 < v1 <    < vk <    < vK .
A market is a vector x = (x1; :::; xK) specifying the proportion of consumers with each of the K
valuations. Thus market x corresponds to a step demand function, where
P
jk
xj is the demand for
the good at any price in the interval (vk 1; vk] (with the convention that v0 = 0). The set of possible










We denote the given aggregate market by
x 2 X: (1)
We hold the aggregate market x xed in the analysis and use stars to indicate properties of the
aggregate market.







xj for all i = 1; :::; K. (2)
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xj for all i = 1; :::; K
)
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Let v , vi be the optimal (i.e., revenue maximizing) uniform price vi for the aggregate market
x. For the entire analysis, it does not matter if there are multiple optimal uniform prices; any one
will do. For notational convenience we shall assume that there is a unique optimal price, and hence


























xk (vk   v) .
We will also be interested in the lowest output q required to generate social surplus of at least the
uniform price producer surplus . This will come from selling to those with the highest valuations;
thus in particular, there must be a critical valuation vi such that the good is always sold to all consumers
with valuations above vi and never sold to consumers with valuations below vi. Thus letting i and






we obtain a lower bound on output which is given by:




The additional variable  2 (0; 1] allows us to randomize the decision to sell to the buyers at threshold
value vi and hence to achieve equality (5) in this nite setting.
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2.1 A Simple Uniform Example
We will use a simple example to illustrate results in this section. Suppose that there are ve possible




In this case, simple calculations show that feasible social surplus is w = 1
5
(1 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5) = 3.
The uniform monopoly price is v = 3 = i. The uniform monopoly prot is then  = 3
5
 3 = 9
5
,
consumer surplus is u = 1
5
(3  3) + 1
5
(4  3) + 1
5
(5  3) = 3
5







The minimum output is q= 2
5
. The consumer and producer surplus for this example is illustrated in
Figure 2.
Figure 2: The Surplus Triangle of Price Discrimination: The Uniform Example
2.2 Segmentation and Pricing Strategy
A segmentation is a division of the social market into di¤erent markets. Thus, a segmentation  is
a simple probability distribution on X, with the interpretation that  (x) is the proportion of the
population in market x. A segmentation can be viewed as a two stage lottery on outcomes f1; :::; Kg
whose reduced lottery is x. Writing supp for the support of a distribution, the set of possible




 (x)  x = x; jsupp ()j <1
9=; .
We restrict attention to nitely many segments, hence jsupp ()j <1, which is without loss of gener-
ality in the present environment with nitely many valuations. A pricing strategy for a segmentation
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 species a price in each market in the support of ,
 : supp ()!  fv1; :::; vKg ; (7)
which gives a distribution over prices for every market. A pricing strategy is optimal if, for each x,
vk 2 supp((x)) implies x 2 Xk, i.e. all prices charged with positive probability must maximize
prot on market x. If a pricing rule puts probability 1 on price v, we will simply write (x) = v, and
otherwise k(x) is the probability of charging price vk in market x. A segmentation  and pricing
strategy  together determine the outcomes that we care about, namely the joint distribution of prices
and consumersvaluations. An example of a segmentation and an associated optimal pricing rule is
given by the case of perfect price discrimination. In this case the pricing strategy is deterministic in
every segment, and we have ve market segments with ve associated prices as illustrated in the table
below:
value 1 value 2 value 3 value 4 value 5 price weight
market 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
5
market 2 0 1 0 0 0 2 1
5
market 3 0 0 1 0 0 3 1
5
market 4 0 0 0 1 0 4 1
5





















k (x)xj (vj   vk) ;
















Our rst result is a linear algebraic characterization of the set Xk of markets where price vk
is optimal. Write Vk for the set of non-empty subsets of fv1; :::; vKg containing vk. We will write
V  , Vi. A subset S 2 Vk represents a nite (support) set of valuations including vk. Now for every
support set S 2 Vk, we dene a market xS : xS =
 
::::; xSi ; :::

2 X,with the properties that (i) no
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consumer has a valuation outside the set S; and (ii) the monopolist is indi¤erent between charging any
price in S. Thus, for every support set S 2 Vk, we dene the market xS by the indi¤erence conditions








and the inclusiveness condition: X
fjjvj2S g
xSj = 1. (9)
Now, for every S, there exists a unique solution to the above condition (8) and (9), which can be
described explicitly in terms of the element of set S. For any S 2 Vk write minS and maxS for the
smallest and largest element of S and, for each element vi 2 S di¤erent from maxS, write  (vi; S) for












, if vi 6= maxS;
minS
maxS
, if vi = maxS:
(10)
There are a nite set of such markets for every Vk. We next show that all markets x 2 Xk in which vk
is an optimal price are convex combinations of these extreme points xS.
Lemma 1 (Extremal Segmentation)





Proof. Xk is a nite-dimensional compact and convex set, so by the Krein-Milman theorem it
is equal to the convex hull of its extreme points. We will show that every extreme point of Xk is
equal to xS for some S 2 Vk. First observe that if vi is an optimal price for market x, then xi > 0.
Otherwise the monopolist would want to deviate to a higher price if
PK
j=i+1 xj > 0 or a lower price if
this quantity is zero, either of which contradicts the optimality of vi.





xi  0, for all i,
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vk for i 6= k.
Any extreme point of Xk must lie at the intersection of exactly K of these constraints. One active
constraint is always
PK
i=1 xi = 1, and since vk is an optimal price, the non-negativity constraint xk  0
is never active. Thus, there are exactly K   1 active non-negativity and pricing constraints for i 6= k.
But as we have argued, we cannot have both the optimality and non-negativity constraints bind for
a given i, so for each i 6= k precisely one of the non-negativity and optimality constraints is binding.
This prole of constraints denes xS, where S is the set valuations which are optimal prices for the
seller.
Thus for the given aggregate market x 2 X there are segmentations of x which have support on
the markets xS for S 2 V  as dened above in (10) only. We refer to any market xS as an extremal
market, and to any segmentation consisting only of extremal markets as an extremal segmentation.
In general, there will be many such segmentations. Our main result using extremal segmentations
does not depend on which one we choose. In our uniform example, the segmentation of the uniform
market x described in the table below represents one such extremal segmentation. This segmentation
is the solution to particular segmentation algorithm, a greedylike algorithm formally described in
the next subsection.
value 1 value 2 value 3 value 4 value 5 weight

















































2.3 Limits of Price Discrimination on Welfare
For a given market x, we dene the minimum pricing rule (x) to deterministically chargemin (supp (x))
and, similarly, we dene the maximum pricing rule  (x) to deterministically charge max (supp (x)).
We observe that the minimum pricing rule always implies an e¢ cient allocation in the market x and
the maximum pricing rule implies an allocation in the market x where there is zero consumer surplus.
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Theorem 1 (Minimum and Maximum Pricing)
In every extremal segmentation, minimum and maximum pricing strategies are optimal; producer sur-
plus is  under every optimal pricing strategy; consumer surplus is zero under the maximum pricing
strategy and consumer surplus is w    under the minimal pricing strategy.
Proof. By construction of the extremal markets, any price in S is an optimal price in market
xS. This implies that minimum and maximum pricing rules are both optimal. Since always setting
the price equal to v is optimal, producer surplus must be exactly  in any extremal segmentation.
Consumer surplus is always zero under the maximum pricing strategy. Since the minimal pricing rule
always gives social surplus w and producer surplus is , consumer surplus must be the di¤erence
w   .
The above result only refers to aggregate consumer surplus over all valuations. But in fact, the
minimum and maximum pricing strategies under every extremal segmentation allow the same predic-
tions to hold pointwise, i.e. for every valuation of the consumer. That is, in the minimum pricing
strategy, the expected net utility for every valuation type of the buyer is (weakly) larger than with
uniform pricing in the aggregate market. Conversely, in the maximum pricing strategy, the expected
net utility for every valuation type of the buyer is (weakly) smaller than with uniform pricing in the
aggregate market. With the maximum pricing rule  (x), this follows directly from the construction of
the maximum pricing rule. After all, only the buyer with the highest value in the segment x purchases
the product under the maximum pricing rule but has to pay exactly his valuation. Hence, the expected
net utility conditional on a purchase is zero, but so is the expected net utility without a purchase. All
valuations are weakly worse o¤ relative to the uniform price in the aggregate market. There, every
buyer with a valuation vi > v received a strictly positive information rent. As for the minimum
pricing rule (x), rst we observe that all e¢ cient trades are realized as opposed to only those with a
value equal or above the uniform price vi  v; second by construction of the minimum pricing rule
(x), all sales are realized at prices below or equal to v. So we have:
Corollary 1 (Pointwise Consumer Surplus )
In every extremal segmentation, for every valuation vi, the expected net utility is (weakly) larger in
the minimum pricing strategy; and (weakly) smaller in the maximum pricing strategy than under the
uniform price in the aggregate market.
Now, if we consider segmentations di¤erent from the extremal segmentation, then it still remains
true that for any segmentation and optimal pricing rule, producer surplus must be at least , consumer
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surplus must be at least zero, and the sum of producer surplus and consumer surplus must be at most
w. And the set of attainable producer surplus and consumer surplus pairs must be convex. So we
have:
Corollary 2 (Surplus Triangle)
For every (; u) satisfying   , u  0 and  + u  w, there exists a segmentation and an optimal
pricing rule with producer surplus  and consumer surplus u.
There is a large multiplicity of segmentations and pricing rules that attain the maximal consumer
surplus and minimal social surplus. We now provide a construction for a canonical "greedy" extremal
segmentation. First put as much mass as we can on the market xsupp(x
), i.e., the extremal market in
which the monopolist is indi¤erent to charging all prices in the support of x. At some point, we will
run out of mass for some valuation in supp (x). We then proceed with a new segment that puts as
much mass as possible on the extremal market corresponding to all remaining valuations; and so on.
More formally, we can describe the greedy algorithm as follows. Let F be the distribution function
of the aggregate market with support V . We shall construct a sequence of sets, S0; :::; SG 2 V  with
G  K   1, which are initialized at S0 = V and satisfy strict set inclusion: Sg+1 ( Sg. Suppose we
"run" the greedy algorithm from time 0 to time 1. Write H (v; t) for the cumulative probability mass
left at time t under the greedy algorithm. Thus H (v; t) is weakly increasing in v for all t and we set
H (v; 0) = F (v) ; for all v 2 V ;
H (vK ; t) = 1  t; for all t 2 [0; 1] :
(12)
We write S (t) for the subset of values v 2 V where probability mass remains at time t. Thus
S (t) , fvk 2 V jH (vk; t) H (vk 1; t)g > 0: (13)
By extension, we dene for every support set S (t), the distribution function F S(t) (v) associated with
the probability distribution of the extremal market xS(t) as dened earlier by (10). And now let
dH (v; t)
dt
,  F S(t) (v) . (14)
Now, clearly, if we start at t = 0, then S (0) = S0 = V . By construction of the greedy algorithm
H (v; t), there must exist a rst time  1  1, where S0 = S (t) 6= S ( 1) for all 0  t <  1. We set
S1 , S ( 1), and by Lemma 1, S1 2 S. Now, clearly, S1 ( S0, and we continue to eat into the
distribution H (v; t), but now removing probability only on the smaller support set S1. Clearly, there
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are at most K   1 reductions of the support set Sg until we reach a singleton set. At each step g of
the induction, we can appeal to Lemma 1 to observe that the remaining support Sg has the inclusion
property Sg 2 V . But since F S(t) (vK) = 1 for all t, it follows that at time t = 1, there is zero residual
probability left, and hence we have achieved a complete segmentation of the aggregate market.
The greedy algorithm uses the insight of Lemma 1 by constructing a sequence of segments, such
that along the sequence, the number of active pricing constraints is strictly decreasing, and the number
of active nonnegativity constraints is strictly increasing. More precisely, each segment g has a distinct
number of non-negativity constraints active, namely at least g, and conversely each segment g, has
a distinct number of pricing constraints active, namely at most (K   1)   g. Generically, at each
stopping time only a single non-negativity constraint switches from being inactive to active, and then
the above statement involving "at most" are exact statements. In our uniform example, the greedy
algorithm gives rise to the segmentation (11) displayed above. If we apply either the minimum pricing
rule  (x) or the maximum pricing rule  (x) to the above segmentation, then we get the following
prices, displayed in the second to last and last column, respectively:
value 1 value 2 value 3 value 4 value 5 weight  (x)  (x)
























































We observe that in the greedy segmentation of the uniform examples above, there are multiple segments
in which the same price is charged under either the minimum or the maximum pricing rule. In fact,





 (x) +  (x0)
x0
Thus, we could merge markets so that a given price is charged in only one segment. More generally,
a direct segmentation has at most K segments, one for each possible price vk, where xk 2 Xk and
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k (x
k)xk = x. The direct pricing strategy is the identity mapping, i.e. k(x
k) = 1. (In contrast to
the extremal markets where the upper case superscript S in xS referred to the support, here the lower
case superscript k in xk refers to price vk charged in the direct segment xk.) It should be clear that
the direct pricing strategy is optimal for direct segmentations constructed in this way, and whenever
we refer to a direct segmentation in the subsequent discussion, it is assumed that the monopolist will
use direct pricing.
Extremal segmentations and direct segmentations are both rich enough classes to achieve any equi-
librium outcome, where again an outcome is a joint distribution of prices and valuations. In particular,
if a segmentation and optimal pricing rule (; ) induce a given outcome, then there is both an ex-
tremal segmentation and optimal pricing strategy (0; 0) and a direct segmentation 00 (and associated
direct pricing strategy 00) that achieve the same outcome. To nd an extremal segmentation, each
market x 2 supp() can itself be decomposed using extremal markets with a segmentation x, using


























In the uniform example, the direct segmentation corresponding to the consumer surplus maximizing
greedy extremal segmentation is:










































where the markets for prices 4 and 5 are degenerate. The direct segmentation corresponding to the
social surplus minimizing greedy extremal segmentation is:
value 1 value 2 value 3 value 4 value 5 price weight
market 3 0 0 1 0 0 3 1
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where the markets for prices 1 and 2 are degenerate.
Direct segmentations are well suited to the exploration of some of the alternative segmentations
that attain the welfare bounds. Let us give a formal description of the rst segmentation described
in the introduction attaining maximum consumer surplus. For each k  i, let market xk have the
features that (i) the lowest valuation in the support is vk; (ii) all values of vk+1 and above appear in
the same relative proportion as in the aggregate population:
xki ,
8>>>><>>>>:




xi ; if i = k;
kx

i ; if i > k;
(16)














By construction of the above equality, both vk and v are optimal prices for segment xk. We can




























We can verify that this segmentation generates maximum consumer surplus by charging in segment
xk the price vk. The direct pricing rule is optimal and gives rise to an e¢ cient allocation. Because the
monopolist is always indi¤erent to charging v, producer surplus is .
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Proposition 1 (Consumer Surplus Maximizing Direct Segmentation)
There exists a direct segmentation and an optimal pricing rule where producer surplus is , consumer
surplus is w    and the output is socially e¢ cient.
In the uniform example, this construction gives rise to the following segmentation:











































2.5 Limits of Price Discrimination on Output
While our focus has been on welfare outcomes, we can also report tight results about output. The
consumer surplus maximizing segmentations are e¢ cient, and therefore maximize output among all
segmentations and optimal pricing rules. To minimize output, we hold social surplus down to  while
also ensuring that the allocation is conditionally e¢ cient, so that the object is always sold to those
who value the object the most. Note that our earlier segmentation (15) attaining minimum social
surplus had some consumers with valuation 3 facing price 3 and thus buying the good but also had
some consumers with valuation 4 facing price 5, and thus not buying the good. The total proportion of
consumers buying the good is 5
12
. But we noted earlier that we attain the minimum producer surplus
 = 9
5





a segmentation and optimal pricing rule in the example which attains minimum social surplus while
only selling to those with valuations 4 and 5:

































More generally, we can always construct a direct segmentation using an inductive, but more subtle
algorithm as in (17)-(18) that attains the output lower bound dened by condition (6). In the resulting
conditionally e¢ cient direct segmentation there will be zero consumer surplus and producer surplus .
In fact, consumers with valuations strictly above i purchase the good at a price equal to their valuation,
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and consumers with valuation i must purchase the good with probability , paying their valuation
if they purchase the good. Consumers with valuations below i will not purchase the good. For the
consumer surplus maximizing segmentation, we started by dening the segment with the lowest price
and worked our way up through prices. To minimize output and social surplus, we adopt a di¤erent
construction that starts by placing the highest value consumer in a segment with price equal to his
own value. We then work our way down through the values. Consumers with a given value will be
apportioned out to all of the segments with weakly higher prices.
Proposition 2 (Quantity Minimizing Direct Segmentation)
There exists a segmentation and optimal pricing rule where producer surplus is , consumer surplus
is 0 and output is q.
Proof. We construct a direct segmentation that achieves the minimum output. We dened
i 2 f1; :::; Kg and  2 (0; 1] as the unique solution of (5), identifying the conditionally e¢ cient and
quantity minimizing allocation that attains the uniform monopoly prot. We now dene a particular
conditionally e¢ cient segmentation. We denote by yki the probability mass of valuation vi consumers
in segment k (which will be charged price vk). Because of our "top-down" construction, it will be
easier to work directly with the object yi, since we will not know how large each market should be
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. For k > i, let
yki ,
8>><>>:
0; if i < k;
xi ; if i = k;
0; if i > k:
(19)
For k = i, let
yii ,
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
0; if i < i;







(1  )xi if i > i;
(20)
and iteratively dene for k = i  1; i  2; :::; 1 :
yki ,
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:














xi if i  i:
(21)
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The segmentation, dened by (19)-(21) satises feasibility by construction. To wit, the ratios appearing
in (20) and (21) are strictly positive and dene shares that sum up to one. This will follow inductively












The right-hand side is non-negative if incentive compatibility is satised. Now it remains to verify
incentive compatibility. The non-trivial conditions we need to check are that prots cannot be increased
by deviating from price vk for k  i to a lower price. Consider the case where k > i. First, observe






































Note that the inequality is strict, since v is the unique uniform monopoly price. (We could have
















































verifying incentive compatibility for k > i > i. The same argument goes through with k = i or k = i,
with suitable allowance for the fact that yii = xi .
The algorithm in the proof deserves some explanation. We start with the denition of i and  in
hand, so we already know which consumers will purchase the good at which prices. This pins down the
distribution of consumers to markets for valuations higher than i. According to the inductive hypoth-
esis, we have successfully assigned consumers for valuations above i without violating the optimality
of price vk on segment yk. The proof shows that there is always enough "room" across all markets to
distribute consumers with valuation vi to markets without violating incentive compatibility, which is
the content of equation (22). In fact, when this inequality is strict, there is more slack than we need
and there are multiple ways to distribute the vi consumers. The proof adopts one particular allocation
rule, which is to make yki =x

i proportional to the amount of slack that would exist in market k if no






j . This has implications for the
structure of the segmentation. Note that the monopolist will be indi¤erent between vk and v in each














The term in the parentheses is common to all k, so the slacks are proportional to vkykk . Inductively,
this will be true for every valuation less than i, and the distribution of valuations below the monopoly
price in each market will be proportional to the prior. We will see that these features have analogues
in the continuous construction of the next section.
3 The Limits of Discrimination: The Continuum Case
We now extend the arguments to a setting with a continuum of values. We construct segmented
markets that mirror those in the environment with nitely many values. Thus we consider a continuum
of buyers, each buyer identied by his valuation v, which are distributed on an interval [v; v] = V  R+
according to a Borel probability measure x (dv). The corresponding distribution function is F (v) ,
x ([v; v]).
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In the nite environment, the extremal segments xS with support S 2 S, in which the seller
is indi¤erent between all the values o¤ered as prices in the set S, played a central role. In the
continuum environment, a complete description of these segments is rather involved, as the support of
any extremal segment does not necessarily have to be connected. Thus, there will be extremal segments
whose distribution function have a countable number of discontinuities. As we observed in the nite
case, the characterization of the surplus triangle (see Corollary 2) can be achieved with either extremal
or direct segmentations, and in this section we use the direct segmentations to establish the consumer
surplus maximizing and the social surplus minimizing segmentation. We rst state an existence result
of minimal and maximal segmentations for arbitrary Borel probability measure x (dv), Theorem 3. We
then narrow our analysis to aggregate markets with di¤erentiable distribution functions, for which we
explicitly construct the minimal and maximal segmentations. The resulting segmentations, given in
Proposition 3 and 4, mirror those in the nite environment, Proposition 1 and 2, respectively.4
We shall assume (as in the discrete case, without loss of generality) that there is a unique uniform
monopoly price p = v. The monopoly prot under the uniform price v is  , v (1  F (v)), and




v x (dv) ; and u ,
vZ
v
(v   v)x (dv) .
3.1 Direct Segmentations
In a direct segmentation, each segment is uniquely associated with a "suggested" price p 2 V , and every
price p 2 V is at most quoted once. A pricing rule in a direct segmentation is a Borel measurable
mapping  : V ! V that maps the prices that index the direct segments into the prices that are
o¤ered to consumers. Without loss of generality, we restrict attention to pure strategies in which
each segment p is charged a possibly di¤erent price p0 =  (p). The identity mapping, in which the
suggested and realized prices agree, is denoted by I . For a given Borel measure  on V V , the space





4The proofs for the environment with a continuum of values are by necessity more elaborate than in the nite
environment, and are all collected in the appendix for online publication.
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(v   (p)) Iv(p)(dv; dp):
We write () , (; I) and u() , u(; I). We say that  is a direct segmentation of x if it satises
the aggregation constraint:
(Y  V ) = x(Y ); (23)
for all measurable subsets Y  V , and it also satises the optimality of the direct pricing strategy:
()  (; ), for every pricing rule . We say that the measure x (dv) is simple if F is a step function
(and thus a nite set of valuations arise with probability 1). We know that for any discrete distribution
over valuations, we can construct direct segmentations that hit both the consumer surplus upper bound
and welfare lower bound, see Proposition 1 and 2. These results can be restated as follows:
Corollary 3 (Simple Measures)
If the measure x(dv) is simple, then there exist direct segmentations, (dv; dp) and (dv; dp), that
achieve the consumer surplus upper bound and the social surplus lower bound, respectively.
Now consider any Borel measure x and associated distribution function F . We can approximate
F by a sequence of step functions Fk that converge to F pointwise at all points of continuity, with
associated measures xk. For each xk, we can nd a direct segmentation, denoted by k, that maximizes
the consumer surplus and a direct segmentation, denoted by k that minimizes social surplus. As the
following result shows, these sequences of direct segmentations have convergent subsequences, and
importantly, the limits of the subsequences are shown to be direct segmentations as well.
Theorem 2 (Direct Segmentations)
There exist direct segmentations  and  of x that attain the upper bound on consumer surplus and
the lower bound on social surplus, respectively.
The above theorem simply asserts the existence of direct segmentations that achieve the relevant
bounds for general measures x (dv) and associated distributions F (v). If F is di¤erentiable, with an
associated density function f , then we can describe specic algorithms to attain the lower bound on
social surplus and the upper bound on consumer surplus.
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3.2 Consumer Surplus (and Output) Maximizing Segmentation
We now describe a segmentation in which the consumer surplus is w  and output is maximal and
equal to one. For every price p 2 [v; v], there will be a market segment associated with price p, in
the sense that it is revenue maximizing to o¤er the product at price p. Each segment p is constructed
so that the distribution of valuations, denoted by Fp (v), satises four properties: it (i) has zero mass
below p, (ii) has a mass point at p, (iii) is proportional to the prior distribution above p, and (iv) the
mass point at p is just large enough to make the seller indi¤erent between p and v. Thus we require
that the revenue for o¤ering price p and price v is the same: p = v (1  Fp (v)) :The unique solution
to the above four conditions is given by the direct segment Fp (v):
Fp (v) ,
8>><>>:
0; if v  v < p;
1  p(1 F (p))
v(1 F (v)) ; if v = p;
1  p(1 F (v))
v(1 F (v)) ; if p < v  v:
(24)
To complete the description of the market segmentation, we need to specify the distribution of the
buyers across the price segments. We write H for the distribution (and h for the corresponding
density) over the prices [v; v] associated with the segments. Given the upper triangular structure of
the segments, and the fact that in each segment the density of valuations is proportional to the original
density, it is su¢ cient to insist that for all v 2 [v; v] ; we haveZ v
v
p
v (1  F (v))f (v)h (p) dp+

1  v (1  F (v))
v (1  F (v))

h (v) = f (v) . (25)
In other words, the density f (v) of every valuation v in the aggregate is recovered by integrating over
the continuous part of the segmented markets, as v is present in every segmented market p with p < v,
and the discrete part, which is due to the presence of the valuation v in the segmented market p with
p = v.
At this point, it is not obvious that the construction of the distribution H based on the condition
(25) should generally succeed. In particular, as we build up H (p) by integrating from below, and
thus attempt to absorb the residual density of valuation v in the market segment p = v, we might be
confronted with two separate issues. First, it could be that we run out of probability to complement
the mass point p = v < v with higher valuations necessary to construct the indi¤erence (24). Second,
it could be that we arrive at p = v and still have a positive residual probability Pr (v  v) to allocate,
which again would not allow us to establish the specic segment p = v, Fv (v).
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But, in fact the condition (25) implicitly denes a separable ordinary di¤erential equation whose
unique solution, given the boundary condition H (v) = 1, is given by:






(1  F (v)) v   (1  F (s)) sds

. (26)
Thus, there exists an equilibrium segmentation that attains the upper bound on the consumer surplus
in the continuum model that mirrors the earlier result for the case of a nite number of valuations,
see (16).
Proposition 3 (Consumer Surplus Maximizing Segmentation)
There exists a direct segmentation, represented by segments Fp (v) and a distribution over segments
H (p), where producer surplus is , consumer surplus is w    and output is socially e¢ cient.
The distribution H (p) implements a particular set of segmented markets which achieve the e¢ cient
allocation with the largest possible consumer surplus. Clearly, just as in the nite environment, it is not
the unique market segmentation which maximizes consumer surplus and yields an e¢ cient allocation,
and extremal segmentations as described in the previous section could also be constructed in the
continuum environment which would achieve the same consumer surplus. In the nite environment,
we described a greedy algorithm that generated a particular extremal segmentation. The greedy
algorithm has a natural translation into a continuum of values which is described in detail in the
working paper version, see Bergemann, Brooks, and Morris (2013).
The explicit construction of the direct segmentation and the distribution over prices H (p) allow us
to conrm the results stated earlier in Corollary 1. The consumer surplus maximizing segmentation
induced by H (p), while maximizing the aggregate consumer surplus, also increases the expected utility
of the consumers pointwise, i.e. conditional on the valuation of the consumer. In fact, the very
construction of the segmentation H (p) allows us to conclude that the expected sales price, conditional
on the valuation v of the consumer, is increasing in the valuation of the consumer.
3.3 Social Surplus (and Output) Minimizing Segmentation
Next, we propose an explicit construction of an output minimizing segmentation for an arbitrary
aggregate market F (v). This construction is similar in spirit to the proof of Proposition 2. We again
write h(p) for the "size" of the market with price p, and Fp(v) for the conditional distribution of
valuations on market p. As in the nite environment, we adopt a construction that starts by placing
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the highest value consumer in a segment with price equal to his own value. We then work our way
down through the values. Consumers with a given value will be apportioned out to all of the segments
with weakly higher prices. For this reason, we do not know how large each segment will be until
we reach the lowest valuation. Thus, it is convenient to work with the upper cumulative probability
1  Fp(v) of every segment p, and we dene the density of valuations v or higher in the segment p by:
Gp(v) , h(p)(1  Fp(v)): (27)
This quantity is analogous to the upper sums of yk used in the discrete case. After Gp (v) is obtained





and Fp (v) = 1  (Gp (v) =h (p)).
Let bv denote the critical valuation v which achieves the monopoly prot  under perfectly dis-
criminatory pricing: Z 1
v=bv v f(v)dv = 
,
and set q = 1   F (bv) (which is the equivalent of (6) in the nite environment). We construct the
segments Gp (v) for each p  bv as follows. We set Gp(v) , 0 for v > p. For bv < v  p, set Gp(v) = f(p).
For v < v < bv, Gp(v) is dened by the di¤erential equation:
gp(v) = f(v)
p f(p)  v Gp(v)
v(1  F (v))  v(1  F (v)) : (28)
This is the analogue of the proportional allocation scheme in the previous section: we allocate a share
of f (v) to market p that is proportional to the "slack" in the incentive constraint pf (p)  v Gp (v).
The denominator is the integral of this slack over all markets. Note that when we get to v, the slack
goes to zero and the weights are not dened. Nonetheless, the di¤erential equation is well dened for
v > v. For v  v, we set
Gp(v) = (1  F (v))
Gp(v
)
1  F (v) : (29)
This also mirrors the discrete construction, in which markets are proportional to the prior below the
monopoly price. Note that Gp (p) = f (p) if p  bv, and Gp (v) = 0 for v > p or p < bv, and so expected




v Gp (v) dvdp =
Z
pbv p f(p)dp = 
;
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and output will be exactly q. Hence, if Gp (v) is incentive compatible, then it will minimize output.
The revenue of the monopolist in market segment p if he sets price v is given by vGp(v), so the incentive
compatibility requirement says that v Gp (v)  p Gp (p) = p f(p) for all p:
Proposition 4 (Social Surplus Minimizing Segmentation)
There exists a direct segmentation, represented by segments Gp (v) (and associated Fp (v)) and distrib-
ution over segments H (p), that results in a conditionally e¢ cient equilibrium segmentation which has
zero consumer surplus, producer surplus of  and output q.
We illustrate the preceding results with an example given by the uniform density on the unit
interval [0; 1]. In this case, the uniform monopoly price is v = 1
2
. The consumer surplus maximizing
segmentation as derived in Proposition 3, leads to an associated distribution function of prices H (p)
given by:
H (p) = 1  1  p
1  2pe
  2p







By contrast, the segmentation of the consumer in the surplus minimizing allocation as described by
Proposition 4 leads to a distribution function of prices given by:







The distributions of prices induced by these distinct direct segmentations are displayed below in Figure
3a, where the upper curve represents the surplus maximizing, the lower curve the surplus minimizing
distribution of prices.









Figure 3a: Distribution of Prices









Figure 3b: Distribution of Sales
The surplus minimizing and maximizing distributions represent optimal pricing policies for distinct
segmentations of the same aggregate market. But even though they share the same aggregate market,
we nd that have very di¤erent structure. In fact, the supports of prices do not overlap at all. These
30
distinct price distributions also lead to very di¤erent allocations. The surplus maximizing pricing
policy generates all e¢ cient sales, and hence the distribution of sales, Q (v) = v exactly replicates
the aggregate distribution F (v), and in the current example, the uniform distribution. By contrast,
the surplus minimizing distribution truncates sales for values v below 1=
p
2. As we described in
Proposition 4, the allocation is conditionally e¢ cient, and hence Q (v) = v   1=
p
2 for v 2 [1=
p
2; 1],
and zero elsewhere. These di¤erent patterns of sales are displayed in Figure 3b, where the upper curve
represents the surplus maximizing, the lower curve the surplus minimizing distribution of prices.
4 Discrimination and Segmentation: A Second Approach
So far, the construction of the extremal segmentations that generated the frontier of welfare outcomes
relied on two features of the environment. First, each consumer demanded a single unit of the good;
and second, the market could be segmented in an arbitrary manner consistent with the aggregation
requirement. In this section, we develop a di¤erent perspective on price discrimination that does not
rely on these assumptions. This permits us to investigate our original question in even broader settings:
What is the set of possible welfare outcomes over a range of feasible market segmentations?
In the earlier sections, a segment represented the willingness to pay for a single unit of the good by
di¤erent consumers. But a segment could just as well measure the willingness to pay of a single agent
who demands more than one unit. In this case, the optimal selling mechanism is not a posted price
but rather consists of a menu of quantity-price bundles to screen consumers, i.e. second degree price
discrimination. Using the tools of this section, we will analyze markets in which the seller employs a
combination of market segmentation and screening.
Pushing in a di¤erent direction, much of the existing literature on price discrimination has con-
sidered two (or nitely many) exogenously given market segments and asked what would happen if
uniform pricing was relaxed to complete discrimination across the segments. There is an intermediate
case in which the monopolist can only segment based on noisy signals about the segments, rather
than the true underlying segments. The noisy signals e¤ectively induce segments which are convex
combinations of the original, exogenous segments. We refer to this as partial segmentation and we will
give examples of the set of welfare outcomes that can be generated by partial segmentation.
In this section, we restrict attention to the case where there are only two possible types of consumer.
This allows us to use a concavication argument used in Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) to construct
optimal information structures from the point of view of maximizing any weighted sum of consumer and
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producer surplus. Thus, this section both examines the substantive question of the robustness of our
analysis, by allowing a richer class of segmentations, as well as documenting a di¤erent methodology
for analyzing the problem.
4.1 Second Degree Price Discrimination
Up to now, we have considered models in which each buyer demands at most a single unit of the
product. We consider a general consumption problem in which the consumer has preferences over a
continuum of quantities, and in which the monopolist may use a more complicated mechanism to screen
consumers. We shall therefore look at a model of quantity discrimination and allow for fully nonlinear
tari¤s in each segment. Importantly, the nonlinear tari¤s can and will vary across segments. Thus, the
results of this section explore what happens when both second and third degree price discrimination
are possible.
We now consider a binary version of the model analyzed in the seminal paper by Maskin and Riley
(1984), and we can alternatively give our analysis a quality discrimination interpretation, as in the
work of Mussa and Rosen (1978). Suppose then that a good can be produced at a variety of quantities
q 2 R+. The utility function of an agent with type v is given by:
u (v; q; t) , vpq   t,
Hence, utility is concave in the quantity consumed. A proportion  of consumers have low willingness-
to-pay, vl > 0, while proportion 1    have high willingness-to-pay, with vh > vl. The rm has
a positive and constant marginal cost of production of c > 0. It follows that the socially e¢ cient






and e¢ cient social surplus is given by
v
p




As before, we are interested in identifying all combinations of consumer and producer surplus that
could arise as a result of some market segmentation. With complete information, the producer extracts
all the surplus and gets the full gains from trade:
w () = 
v2l
4c






By contrast, if the producer has zero information beyond the prior distribution of the consumers,
then the optimal screening solution is for the producer to "exclude" the low valuation buyers if their
proportion  is su¢ ciently small:
  b , 1  vl
vh
,
and to sell the socially e¢ cient quantity q (vh) to the high valuation buyer while extracting the entire
surplus. On the other hand, if the proportion of low valuation buyers is high, i.e.,   ̂, then the
high type is again sold the e¢ cient quantity q (vh), but now the low type consumer receives quantity:
ql () ,






tl () , vl
(vl   (1  ) vh)
2c
;
while the high type pays
th () ,
(vh   vl)2 + vhvl
2c
:











(vh   vl)2   vh (vh   2vl)





and consumer surplus is
u () ,
8<: 0, if   1  vlvh ;1 
2c
(vh   vl) (vl   (1  ) vh) if   1  vlvh :
(32)
In Figure 4a we illustrate the prot  () and its concavication  (), which are the lower and upper
curve, respectively. Similarly, the consumer surplus u (), as well as its concavied versions u () are
displayed in Figure 4b by the lower curve and the upper curve respectively, all for vl = 1; vh = 2; c =
1=2.
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Figure 4a:  and
concavied 
Figure 4b: u and
concavied u
These illustrations immediately indicate some elementary properties of the prot maximizing or
consumer surplus maximizing segmentations, which hold true for all values 0 < vl < vh and c > 0.
The concavied prot function  () strictly dominates the convex prot function  () and hence
the seller always prefers pure segmentation, i.e. segments which contain either only low or only high
valuations customers. By contrast, it is indicated by the concavied consumer surplus function that
the maximal consumer surplus is attained without any segmentation with a large share  of low
valuation buyers, whereas a small share  of low valuation buyers requires market segmentation to
achieve maximal consumer surplus. Given the binary type space, a segment is uniquely identied by
the proportion of low valuation buyers. We denote by s a segment with a fraction  of low valuation
buyers.
We now describe the construction of the entire equilibrium payo¤ set. We describe the entire
frontier of the equilibrium payo¤ set as the solution to a weighted welfare maximization problem,
where we attach the weights u and  to the consumer and producer surplus respectively. Thus, the
objective function is uu () +  (). We shall restrict attention to the case where u > 0, however,
the analysis extends to zero or negative weight on consumer surplus in a straightforward manner. With
the restriction to u > 0, it is convenient to normalize the weight of the consumer surplus: u , 1,
and vary the weight of the producer surplus, setting  ,  2 R+, and thus the weighted sum is:
w () , u () +  () : (33)
The concavication of the weighted sum w () is given by a linear segment that connects w (0) with
an interior point of the function w (), and a tangency point , that is uniquely determined as a
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function of the weight :
 =
(vh   vl) (2  )
(2  ) vh   vl
: (34)
Proposition 5 (Segmentation and Second Degree Price Discrimination)
The weighted welfare sum w () is maximized by :
1. for  > 1, pure segmentation; the population is divided into segments with s with  2 f0; 1g;
2. for   1, mixed segmentation;
(a) if  < , the population is divided into two segments s with  2 f0; g;
(b) if   , the population is pooled in a single segment s.
Proof. The weighted welfare sum w () given by:
w () =








(vh   vl) (vl   vh (1  )) (1  ) ; if  > 1  vlvh :
The concavication of w (), denoted by w (), is given by a linear segment that connects w (0)
with an interior point of the function w (), where the linear function has the form
l () ,  1
4c
v2h + ,
and the tangency point  and the slope of the linear segment  are obtained by the unique solution
of the tangency condition: l () = w () ; l0 () = w0 (), which uniquely determines  and  as
follows
 ,
((2  ) (vh   vl))




v2l   (2  )v2h
2   :
We verify that the contact by the linear segment occurs in the interval (0; 1) ; i.e.
 =
(vh   vl) (2  )
(2  ) vh   vl
 1,
and thus nd that
(vh   vl) (2  )
(2  ) vh   vl
 1,   1.
which establishes the results.
Using this characterization, we can explicitly compute the set of equilibrium consumer and producer
surplus pairs. For any given , we know that the expected payo¤s must be contained in a triangle
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as before: social surplus cannot be more than w (), consumer surplus is at least 0 and producer
surplus is at least  (). But in contrast to the earlier analysis with linear rather than concave utility
in the quantity, the set of equilibrium payo¤s that can arise in some form of segmentation is given by
a strictly smaller set, namely the shaded area, and hence a strict subset of the surplus triangle.
We focus on the consumer surplus maximizing segmentation and the comparison with the equi-
librium surplus in the aggregate market. If there are few buyers with a low valuation, then in the
aggregate market, the seller will not o¤er a product to the low valuation agents. We refer to this as
the case of the exclusive prior. Here, in the equilibrium without any additional information, the seller
extracts all the surplus from the high valuation buyers, and the equilibrium is socially ine¢ cient. An
important consequence of the exclusive prior is that any non-trivial segmentation will increase social
surplus, and hence strictly increase the revenue of the seller and weakly increase the surplus of the
buyers. Importantly, in cases where there is non-trivial screening, any attempt to increase the surplus
of the buyers, and hence their information rent, leads to an ine¢ cient allocative decision by the seller.
In consequence, the e¢ cient frontier can only be reached with perfect segmentation s 2 fs0; s1g, as
illustrated for  = 1=3 in Figure 5a.
If the prior probability  is above the critical point b, then the seller starts o¤ering a low quantity
version of the product to the low value buyers in the aggregate market, the case of the inclusive prior.
In contrast to the case of the exclusive prior, there now exist segmentations which strictly improve
the revenue of the seller while lowering consumer surplus. As before the e¢ cient frontier can be
attained only through perfect segmentation. Eventually, as  increases above  > b, the equilibrium
in the aggregate market leads to the largest possible consumer surplus. In fact, any segmentation
now increases the revenue of the seller and strictly decreases the surplus of the buyers. We have
thus arrived at an environment where segmentation (and hence additional information for the seller)
unambiguously increases his revenue and decreases consumer surplus. This is illustrated for  = 0:9
in Figure 5b.
Finally, if the share  of low value buyers is between b and , then there are segmentations of the
aggregate market, in particular those involving s0 and s, that can increase both the prots of the
seller and the surplus of the buyers. The resulting equilibrium set then displays features of both of
the above sets. Namely, there are segmentations that increase both the consumers and the producers
as in the exclusive prior, but the Bayes Nash equilibrium of the aggregate market already leaves the
consumer with some information rent, just as in the above case of the inclusive prior with a large
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We conclude with a distinct interpretation of the quantity discriminating monopolist, which allows us
to link the present analysis more closely to the traditional analysis of third degree price discrimination.
We continue with the binary type model, but now take each type to represent a separate market with
a distinct demand function given by qi(p), with i = l; h. The aggregate demand function is given by:
q(p) , ql(p) + (1  ) qh(p);
where  represent the share of the lowdemand market l. Our analysis follows the approach taken
in the previous subsection. We start by computing consumer and producer surplus as a function of .
Then, for every possible (positive) weight of consumer and producer surplus, we nd the concavication
of the weighted sum of these two objectives. This is a versatile technique that can be used to solve
for the potential welfare consequences of partial segmentation for any demand specication. We will
use the remainder of this section to exhibit the (numerical) solution of two prominent examples that
have been considered in the literature.
5We analyzed the problem of quantity discrimination with concave utility functions and linear cost function. In fact,
already in the model with a single unit demand, i.e. without quality discrimination, but increasing aggregate costs, the
above qualications regarding the set of attainable equilibrium payo¤s obtain.
37
Linear Demand The classic example of market segmentation is that of two markets with linear
demand. This example was rst explored in Pigou (1920), who famously concluded that uniform
price and full segmentation both result in the same output, but full segmentation allocates the good
ine¢ ciently and reduces welfare. In the linear example of Pigou (1920), demand is given in market
i 2 fl; hg by:
qi(p) =
8<: 0; if p  bi;bi   p; if 0  p < bi;
and we set bl = 1 and bh = b  1 +
p
2. If the share of the low demand market is su¢ ciently small, or
  b(b  2)
(b  1)2 , b;
then it is optimal to exclude the low demand segment in the aggregate market by setting the uniform
price p = b
2








































; if   bq:
For an inclusive prior  > b, the frontier of welfare outcomes is generated by two families of segmen-
tations: the rst consists of perfect discrimination, where one segment has demand qh and the other








and consists of a segment of size  with demand bql + (1  b)qh, and a segment of size 1   that has
demand ql + (1   )qh where  =  bq1  . Note that  = 0 corresponds to a single segment which is
the aggregate market, and  = 1 
1 b corresponds to having one segment consist of only low demand









Figure 6b: Logistic Demand
Surplus Set
We see that even in this simple setting, there is a large set of possible welfare outcomes that can
result from partial segmentation. Nonetheless, uniform pricing remains the best for consumers, and
full segmentation is necessarily best for the producer.
Logistic Demand Our second example is drawn from Cowan (2012) and here demand follows the
logistic function for i 2 fl; hg:
qi(p) =
1
1 + exp (p  ai)
,
with ah > al > 0. With logistic demand, both markets are always served, full discrimination always
raises welfare, and under fairly general conditions full discrimination raises consumer surplus as well
(see Cowan (2012), (2013)).
For this demand specication, there is no closed form expression for the optimal price as a function
of . Nonetheless, it is straightforward to compute the optimal price numerically. We illustrate in
Figure 6b the attainable equilibrium surplus set for ah = 3, al = 1, and  = 0:5.
Similar to the Pigouvian example, the frontier of the welfare set is generated by two families of
segmentations: A family where one of the segment has only high demand consumers, and a family
where one segment has only low demand consumers. Both consumer surplus and welfare rise with full
discrimination. Interestingly, consumer surplus is not maximized at full discrimination, but rather at
a partial segmentation where one segment has only high demand consumers.
The takeaway from these examples is that even with restrictions on the form of segmentation,
such as a convex combination of two given segments, there will generally be a large set of possible
welfare outcomes due to partial segmentation. Many objectives, e.g., maximizing consumer surplus,
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will be achieved by segmentations that give the monopolist an intermediate level of information about
demand.
5 Conclusion
It was the objective of this paper to study the impact of information on the e¢ ciency and the distri-
bution of surplus in a canonical setting of monopoly price discrimination. We showed that additional
information above and beyond the prior distribution can have a substantial e¤ect on producer and
consumer surplus. In general, there are many directions in which welfare could move relative to the
benchmark of a unied market. We showed that while additional information can never hurt the seller,
it can lead social and consumer surplus to both increase, both decrease, or respectively increase and
decrease. The range of these predictions is established without any restrictions on the distribution in
the aggregate market, and in particular does not rely on any regularity or concavity assumption with
respect to the aggregate distribution or prot function.
Exactly which form of market segmentation arises in practice is no doubt inuenced by many
factors, which may include technological and legal limitations on how information can be collected and
used. In an age in which individuals are increasingly concerned about the preservation of privacy, it is
important to understand the welfare consequences that may result from companies amassing data on
consumerspreferences. Our ndings indicate that the relationship between e¢ ciency and information
can only be understood in the context of how data will be used, and this crucially depends on the
preferences of those who collect the information. Thus, a natural and important direction for future
research is to better understand which forms of price discrimination will endogenously arise, and for
whose benet.
References
Acquisti, A., and H. Varian (2005): Conditioning Prices on Purchase History,Marketing Science,
24, 367381.
Aguirre, I., S. Cowan, and J. Vickers (2010): Monopoly Price Discrimination and Demand
Curvature,American Economic Review, 100, 16011615.
Aumann, R., and M. Maschler (1995): Repeated Games with Incomplete Information. MIT.
40
Bergemann, D., B. Brooks, and S. Morris (2013): The Limits of Price Discrimination,Dis-
cussion Paper 1896, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
Bergemann, D., and S. Morris (2013a): Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and Comparison of Infor-
mation Structures,Discussion paper, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale Univer-
sity.
(2013b): Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information,Econometrica, forth-
coming.
Cowan, S. (2012): Third-Degree Price Discrimination and Consumer Surplus,Journal of Industrial
Economics, 60, 333345.
(2013): Welfare-Increasing Third-Degree Price Discrimination,Discussion paper, Oxford
University.
Kamenica, E., and M. Gentzkow (2011): Bayesian Persuasion,American Economic Review,
101, 25902615.
Maskin, E., and J. Riley (1984): Monopoly with Incomplete Information, Rand Journal of
Economics, 15, 171196.
Mussa, M., and S. Rosen (1978): Monopoly and Product Quality,Journal of Economic Theory,
18, 301317.
Nahata, B., K. Ostaszewski, and P. Sahoo (1990): Direction of Price Changes in Third-Degree
Price Discrimination,American Economic Review, 80, 12541258.
Pigou, A. (1920): The Economics of Welfare. Macmillan, London.
Robinson, J. (1933): The Economics of Imperfect Competition. Macmillan, London.
Schmalensee, R. (1981): Output and Welfare Implications of Monopolistic Third-Degree Price
Discrimination,American Economic Review, 71, 242247.
Taylor, C. (2004): Consumer Privacy and the Market for Customer Information,RAND Journal
of Economics, 35, 631651.
Varian, H. (1985): Price Discrimination and Social Welfare,American Economic Review, 75, 870
875.
41
6 Appendix for Online Publication
We establish Theorem 2 through a sequence of lemmas that begin by establishing general results about
sequences of direct segmentations. In the following, we take fkg to be a convergent subsequence that
converges to .
Lemma 2 For any sequence fkg of direct segmentations on fxkg, there exists  and a subsequence
fklgsuch that kl ) .
Proof. Since V 2 is a compact metric space, the space of Borel measures on V 2 is compact in the
weak topology. Moreover, this topology is metrizable with the Prokhorov metric. Compact metric
spaces are sequentially compact, so a subsequence of k converges to some .
The limit  is a measure on V 2, but at this point it is not clear that it is a direct segmentation. Weak
convergence guarantees that the expectation of any continuous function on V 2 under k converges to
its expectation under . But prot is not a continuous function; it has a discontinuity where v = p.
Indeed, there will be pricing rules for which  (k; ) converges to something strictly less than  (; ).
Nonetheless, for any , there exists a 0 such that  (k; 
0) does converge to  (; 0), and  (; 0) is
close to  (; ).
Lemma 3 Suppose fkg are direct segmentations such that k ) . Then for any  > 0 and pricing
rule , there exists a pricing rule 0 such that




Proof. By Lusins theorem, for every ~, there exists a continuous function ~ that is continuous
and coincides with  except on a set of measure ~. Here, the measure is taken to be the marginal
measure of  on p, denoted p(dp), i.e. for any Borel set Y  V , p (Y ) =  (V  Y ). Note that
j(; ~)  (; )j < ~v.
Now dene bt , maxf0; ~  t~g for t 2 (0; 1). In other words, bt is ~ translated down by t~, with
truncation at zero. Dene epi(h) , f(v; p) 2 V 2jv  h(p)g to be the epigraph of the Borel function
h : V ! V .
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Claim: If ~" 6= 0, there exists a t  0 such that (@epi(bt)) = 0. For each t  0, the @epi(bt) are
disjoint sets; if (@epi(bt)) > 0 for all t, then taking the union over all such sets we would nd that
the set V 2 has innite measure.
If ~" 6= 0, take any t such that (@epi(bt)) = 0, and let 0 = bt. Otherwise, we can set 0 = ~" = 0.
Let Y = epi(0). Note that the set Y is compact (being the epigraph of a continuous function) and
-continuous. Write kjY and jY for the respective measures restricted to Y .
Claim: kjY ) jY . This is true if kjY (Z) ! jY (Z) for all Z  Y such that jY (@Z) = 0.
Since (@Y ) = 0, and @Z  Y (since Y is closed), then any jY -continuous Z must also be -
continuous, since (@Z) = (@Z \ @Y ) + (@Z n @Y ) = jY (@Z n @Y ) = jY (@Z) = 0. Thus,
kjY (Z) = k(Z)! (Z) = jY (Z), and we are done.
Note that the function 0 is continuous when restricted to Y (since 0 itself is continuous). Since



























=  (; 0) :

















 (; ~)  ~:
Thus,
(; 0)  (; )  (v + 1)~
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So taking ~ < 
v+1
, we have the desired result.
The rst condition says that 0 achieves a payo¤ for the monopolist within  of . The second
condition is that the payo¤ from  is continuous in the limit. Using this result, we can prove properties
of the limit measure .
Lemma 4 Suppose fkg are direct segmentations of fxkg such that k ) r and xk ) x. Then  is
a direct segmentation of x. Moreover, u(k)! u() and (k)! ().
Proof. First we show that  has x as a marginal measure. Take any continuous and bounded









(v)x(dv). But (v) is a con-











(v)x(dv) for all continuous and bounded (v), and we are done.
Note that (v   p)1vp is continuous in v and p, so u(k) ! u() follows from weak convergence.
To see that (k)! (), observe that p1vp is upper semi-continuous, so lim supk!1 (k)  ().
Suppose the inequality is strict. Then by the previous Lemma, for every  > 0 there exists a pricing rule
0 such that (k; 
0)! (; 0)  ()  . But (k)  (k; 0), since k is a direct segmentation,
a contradiction. Hence (k)! ().
Finally, we show that ()  (; ) for all pricing rules . If not, again we can nd an 0 such
that (; 0) > () and (k; 
0) ! (; 0). But (k)  (k; 0), so limk!1 (k) > (), a
contradiction.
We are now able to establish Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 2. Take  to be a limit of a subsequence of k, and  to be a limit of a
subsequence of k. We know that these limits exist and they are direct segmentations, and that  and
u converge continuously. All that remains to show is that  and u converge to the bounds for x.
For all k, we have (k) = maxp p(1 Fk(p)). So we can show that maxp p(1 Fk(p))! maxp p(1 
F (p)). Take v to be the solution to maxp p(1   F (p)). Since F has countably many discontinuities,
for every  > 0 there is a p > v such that F is continuous at p, and v(1 F (v)) p(1 F (p)) < .





p(1  Fk(p))  lim
k!1
p(1  Fk(p))
= p(1  F (p))
 v(1  F (v))  
44
showing that limk!1maxp p(1 Fk(p))  maxp p(1 F (p)). Write pk for a solution tomaxp p(1 Fk(p));
the pk live in the compact set V , so there is a subsequence that converge to some p̂. Again, there is a
p > p̂ at which F is continuous and






and we are done.
Clearly u(k) = 0 for all k, so u() = 0. Also, we know that u(k) =
R
V
v xk(dv)   (k). Since
(v) = v is a continuous function, u(k)!
R
V
v x(dv)  (), and we are done.
Proof of Theorem 3. We verify that the solution (26) of the density:
h (p) =
(1  F (p)) f (p) p







solves the balancing condition:Z v
v
p
p (1  F (p))f (v)h (p) dp+

1  v (1  F (v))
p (1  F (p))

h (v) = f (v) . (36)




p (1  F (p))f (v)
(1  F (p)) f (p) p








p (1  F (p))  v (1  F (v))
p (1  F (p))

(1  F (p)) f (p) p










































So, if we dene







h (p) = H 0 (p) =
pf (p)






and so Z v
0
H 0 (p) dp = [H (p)]v0 = H (p) H (0) .
The distribution function H (p) is everywhere continuous, and in particular does not have a mass point






(1  F (p)) p   (1  F (s)) sds =1.
For the divergence of the integral, it is su¢ cient to establish that the term inside the integral grows
su¢ ciently fast as p! p:
sf (s)
(1  F (p)) p   (1  F (s)) s:





is convergent if and only if p < 1. It thus follows that the integral always diverges, (as it relies on the
square rather than the linear term, due to the rst condition), and hence there is no mass point at the
optimal price v. Namely, we can approximate the above ratio, using the quadratic polynomial:
f (x) = f (x0) + f
0 (x0) (x  x0) +
1
2
f 00 (x0) (x  x0)2
and applying it to the function X (s) as dened below:
X (s) , (1  F (s)) s;
we get
X 0 (s) = (1  F (s))  f (s) s; X 00 (s) =  2f (s)  f 0 (s) s;
and thus we have the following approximation, using the fact the 0 th term and the 1 st term vanish,
(the later due to the rst order condition):
pf (p)
(2f (p) + f 0 (p) p) (p  p)2
:
46
The approximation rate is quadratic rather than sublinear and hence the integral diverges as p! p.
Proof of Theorem 4. Write G(v) = 1   F (v), and let Gp(v) be the density of consumers
who are o¤ered price p and have valuation at least v. Set Gp(v) = f(p) for p 2 [v̂; v] and v 2 [v̂; p]






f(p)dp = G(v). We construct
Gp(v) for v < v̂. We want to maintain Gp(v0) <
v f(v)







v G(v) < v G(v), set
gp(v) = g(v)
p f(p)  v Gp(v)
v G(v)  v G(v) ;





































Gp(t)dp = G(t) for all t < v, then it must be true for v as well, since the weight on
g(t) inside the integral is 1. Since its true for v = v̂, we are done.
Claim 2: Gp(v)  p f(p)v for all p and v. Suppose not, and let v
0 be the largest v at which v Gp(v)
goes above p f(p) for some p, i.e. v Gp(v) > v0Gp(v0) = p f(p) for all v 2 (v0   ; v0). Since Gp(v) is






=  v0gp(v0) +Gp(v0) < 0:
Note that Gp(v0)  0, since v Gp(v)  p f(p) for v  v0, and therefore gp(v) is positive on that region.
For the derivative at v0 to be negative, we would then need that v0gp(v0) > Gp(v0). However, from the
denition of gp(v) its clear that if v0G(v0) < vG(v), gp(v0) = 0, which would be a contradiction. If
v0G(v0)  vG(v), then gp(v0) = p f(p)v02 , so





again a contradiction. Hence, it must be that Gp(v)  p f(p)v for all v.
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Claim 3: vGp(v) = p f(p). Follows easily from the previous two claims, sinceZ v
v̂






and Gp(v)  p f(p)v for every p, so in fact they must be equal (almost everywhere).
In fact, it is always the case that Gp(v) = G(v)
Gp(v)








































and hence, the segments are linear interpolations between Gv̂(v) and G1(v).
